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Abstract— In vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs), 
because of the nonexistence of end-to-end connections, it 
is essential that nodes take advantage of connection 
opportunities to forward messages to make end-to-end 
messaging possible. Thus, it is crucial to make sure that 
nodes have incentives to forward messages for others, 
despite the fact that the routing protocols in VANETs are 
different from traditional end-to-end routing protocols. 
In this paper, stimulation of message forwarding in 
VANETs is concerned. This approach is based on 
coalitional game theory, particularly, an incentive scheme 
for VANETs is proposed and with this scheme, following 
the routing protocol is in the best interest of each node. In 
addition, a lightweight approach is proposed for taking 
the limited storage space of each node into consideration.  
 
Index Terms— Coalitional game, cooperation, game 
theory, VANET 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The primary VANET's goal is to increase road safety. 
To achieve this, the vehicles act as sensors and exchange 
warnings or – more generally – telematics information (like 
current speed, location or ESP activity) that enables the 
drivers to react early to abnormal and potentially dangerous 
situations like accidents, traffic jams or glaze. The 
information provided by other vehicles and stationary 
infrastructure might also be used for driver assistant systems 
like adaptive cruise control (ACC) or breaking assistants. In 
addition, authorized entities like police or firefighters should 
be able to send alarm signals and instructions. 
 Mostly interests to MANETS belong to the VANETS but 
the features are different. Vehicles are likely to move in 
structured way. The connection with wayside equipment can 
similarly be indicated absolutely accurately. In the end, 
mostly automobiles are limited in their motion range, such as 
being controlled to pursue a paved way.  
VANET suggests unlimited advantage to companies 
of any size. Vehicles access of fast speed internet which will 
change the automobiles’ on-board system from an effective 
widget to necessary productivity equipment, making nearly 
any internet technology accessible in the car. Thus this 
network does pretend specific security concerns as one 
problem is no one can type an email during driving safely. 
This is not a potential limit of VANET as productivity 
equipment. It permits the time which has wasted for 
something in waiting called “dead time”, has turned into the 
time which is used to achieve tasks called “live time”. 
If a traveler downloads his email, he can transform 
jam traffic into a productive task and read on-board system 
and read it himself if traffic stuck. One can browse the internet 
when someone is waiting in car for a relative or friend. If GPS 
system is integrated it can give us a benefit about traffic 
related to reports to support the fastest way to work. Finally, it 
would permit for free, like Skype or Google Talk services 
within workers, reducing telecommunications charges. 
Safety applications would be Slow/Stop Vehicle Advisor 
(SVA) in which a slow or stationary vehicle will broadcast 
warning message to its neighbourhood. Another similar type 
of application is emergency electronic brake-light (EEBL). In 
Post Crash Notification (PCN), a vehicle involved in an 
accident would broadcast warning messages about its position 
to trailing vehicles so that it can take decision with time in 
hand as well as to the highway patrol for tow away support. 
Road Hazard Control Notification (RHCN) deals with cars 
notifying other cars about road having landslide. Another 
related application would be road feature notification which 
deals with notification due to road curve, sudden downhill etc. 
Cooperative Collision Warning (CCW) alerts two drivers 
potentially under crash route so that they can mend their ways. 
Congested Road Notification (CRN) detects and notifies 
about road congestions          which can be used for route and 
trip planning. TOLL is yet another application for vehicle toll 
collection at the toll booths without stopping the vehicles. 
Parking Availability Notification (PAN) helps to find the 
availability of slots in parking lots in a certain geographical 
area.  
Remote Vehicle Personalization / Diagnostics (RVP/D) 
helps in downloading of personalized vehicle settings or 
uploading of vehicle diagnostics from/to infrastructure. 
Service Announcements (SA) would be of particular interest 
to roadside business like petrol pumps, highways restaurants 
to announce their services to the drivers within 
communication range. Content Map Database Download 
(CMDD) acts as a portal for getting valuable information 
from mobile hotspots or home stations. Using Real Time 
Video Relay (RTVR), on-demand movie experience will not 
be confined to the constraints of the home and the driver can 
ask for real time video relay of his favorite movies. 
The inter-vehicle communication configuration uses 
multi-hop multicast/broadcast to transmit traffic related 
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information over multiple hops to a group of receivers. There 
are two types of message forwarding in inter-vehicle 
communications i)Naïve broadcasting  ii)Intelligent 
broadcasting. 
In naïve broadcasting, vehicles send broadcast messages 
periodically and at regular intervals.Upon receipt of the 
message, the vehicle ignores the message if it has come from a 
vehicle behind it. If the message comes from a vehicle in 
front, the receiving vehicle sends its own broadcast message 
to vehicles behind it. This ensures that all enabled vehicles 
moving in the forward direction get all broadcast messages. 
The limitations of the naïve broadcasting method is that large 
numbers of broadcast messages are generated, therefore, 
increasing the risk of message collision resulting in lower 
message delivery rates and increased delivery times. 
In intelligent broadcasting addresses the problems inherent 
in naïve  broadcasting by limiting the number of messages 
broadcast for a given emergency event. If the event-detecting 
vehicle receives the same message from behind, it assumes 
that at least one vehicle in the back has received it and ceases 
broadcasting. The assumption is that the vehicle in the back 
will be responsible for moving the message along to the rest of 
the vehicles. If a vehicle receives a message from more than 
one source it will act on the first message. 
The vehicle-to-roadside communication represents a single 
hop  broadcast where the roadside unit sends a broadcast 
message to all equipped vehicles in the vicinity. 
Vehicle-to-roadside communication configuration provides a 
high bandwidth link between vehicles and roadside units. The 
roadside units may be placed every kilometer or less, enabling 
high data rates to be maintained in heavy traffic. 
For instance, when broadcasting dynamic speed limits, the 
roadside unit will determine the appropriate speed limit 
according to its internal timetable and traffic conditions. The 
roadside unit will periodically broadcast a message 
containing the speed limit and will compare any geographic or 
directional limits with vehicle data to determine if a speed 
limit warning applies to any of the vehicles in the vicinity. If a 
vehicle violates the desired speed limit, a broadcast will be 
delivered to the vehicle in the form of an auditory or visual 
warning, requesting that the driver reduce his speed. The 
routing-based communication is a multi-hop unicast where a 
message is propagated in a multi-hop fashion until the vehicle 
carrying the desired data is reached. When the query is 
received by a vehicle owning the desired piece of information, 
the application at that vehicle immediately sends a unicast 
message containing the information to the vehicle it received 
the request from, which is then charged with the task of 
forwarding it towards the query source. 
Routing protocols such as RIP and EIGRP are 
Distance Vector routing protocols. These are called Distance 
Vector protocols because they base routing decisions on the 
“distance” of the remote destination in terms of the number 
of network layer hops that the packet will have to 
traverse.OSPF and IS-IS are Link State routing protocols. 
They are called Link State protocols because they base 
routing decisions on messages received from other routers in 
the internetwork that give information about the state of the 
links connected to them. 
Game theory is the formal study of conflict and 
cooperation. Game theoretic concepts apply whenever the 
actions of several agents are interdependent. These agents 
may be individuals, groups, firms, or any combination of 
these. The concepts of game theory provide a language to 
formulate, structure, analyze, and understand strategic 
scenarios. 
The object of study in game theory is the game, 
which is a formal model of an interactive situation. It typically 
involves several players; a game with only one player is 
usually called a decision problem. The formal definition lays 
out the players, their preferences, their information, the 
strategic actions available to them, and how these influence 
the outcome. 
A coalitional (or cooperative) game is a high-level 
description, specifying only what payoffs each potential 
group, or coalition, can obtain by the cooperation of its 
members. What is not made explicit is the process by which 
the coalition forms. Cooperative game theory investigates 
such coalitional games with respect to the relative amounts of 
power held by various players, or how a successful coalition 
should divide its proceeds. 
Ad hoc networks rely on the cooperation of 
participating nodes to route data between source and 
destination pairs that are outside each other's communication 
range. Because such data forwarding consumes valuable (and 
scarce) battery power, each node along the path has an 
inherent disincentive to cooperate. This tension between 
cooperation and cost invites a game-theoretic study, where 
each node must strategically decide the degree to which it 
must volunteer its resources for the common good of the 
network. 
A game is cooperative if the players are able to form 
binding commitments. For instance the legal system requires 
them to adhere to their promises. In noncooperative games 
this is not possible. communication among players is allowed 
in cooperative games, but not in noncooperative ones. 
Noncooperative games are able to model situations to the 
finest details, producing accurate results. Cooperative games 
focus on the game at large.. Hybrid games contain 
cooperative and non-cooperative elements. For instance, 
coalitions of players are formed in a cooperative game, but 
these play in a non-cooperative fashion. 
A symmetric game is a game where the payoffs for playing 
a particular  strategy depend only on the other strategies 
employed, not on who is playing them. If the identities of the 
players can be changed without changing the payoff to the 
strategies, then a game is symmetric. Asymmetric games are 
games where there are not identical strategy sets for both 
players. For instance, the ultimatum game and similarly the 
dictator game have different strategies for each player. It is 
possible, however, for a game to have identical strategies for 
both players, yet be asymmetric. For example, the game 
pictured to the right is asymmetric despite having identical 
strategy sets for both players. 
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Zero-sum games are a special case of constant-sum games, 
in which choices by players can neither increase nor decrease 
the available resources. In zero-sum games the total benefit to 
all players in the game, for every combination of strategies, 
always adds to zero. Many games studied by game theorists 
(including the famous prisoner's dilemma) are non-zero-sum 
games, because some outcomes have net results greater or less 
than zero. Informally, in non-zero-sum games, a gain by one 
player does not necessarily correspond with a loss by another. 
Simultaneous games are games where both players move 
simultaneously, or if they do not move simultaneously, the 
later players are unaware of the earlier players' actions 
(making them effectively simultaneous). Sequential games (or 
dynamic games) are games where later players have some 
knowledge about earlier actions. This need not be perfect 
information about every action of earlier players; it might be 
very little knowledge. For instance, a player may know that an 
earlier player did not perform one particular action, while he 
does not know which of the other available actions the first 
player actually performed. 
The difference between simultaneous and sequential games 
is captured in the different representations .Often, normal 
form is used to represent simultaneous games, and extensive 
form is used to represent sequential ones. The transformation 
of extensive to normal form is one way, meaning that multiple 
extensive form games correspond to the same normal form. 
Consequently, notions of equilibrium for simultaneous games 
are insufficient for reasoning about sequential games. 
 
II. EXISTING SYSTEM 
Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs)[1] are envisioned to 
provide promising applications and services. One critical 
deployment issue in VANETs is to motivate vehicles and their 
drivers to cooperate and contribute to packet forwarding in 
vehicle-to-vehicle or vehicle-to-roadside communication. To 
achieve fairness and provide motivative stimulation for 
participation, a Fair Reimbursement And Motivating 
sweepstake scheme (FRAME) is proposed. The FRAME 
scheme contains two major components: a weighted 
rewarding component and a sweepstake component. Based on 
the contribution measurement, the weighted rewarding 
component utilizes a convex function to calculate each 
vehicle’s weight and allocate rewards according to the 
calculated weights. The sweepstake component awards a 
fixed amount to the winning vehicle that participates in the 
forwarding. The FRAME scheme is used to overcome the 
drawbacks of two straight   forward schemes such as Receipt 
counting method and Proportional rewarding method. 
A variable-rate and variable-power MQAM modulation 
scheme [2] is proposed for high-speed data transmission over 
fading channels. The spectral efficiency of our variable-rate 
variable-power MQAM technique is determined and compare 
with the Shannon capacity limit, where capacity is achieved 
using adaptive transmission techniques. High speed wireless 
data transmission requires robust and spectrally efficient 
communication techniques for flat-fading channels. When the 
channel can be estimated and this estimate sent back to the 
transmitter, the transmission scheme can be adapted relative 
to the channel characteristics.  The variable-rate 
variable-power techniques increase the spectral efficiency of 
a single channel. This technique suffers a large power penalty 
since most of the average signal power is used to compensate 
for deep fades. It will increase the co channel interference.  
The aim of [3] is to construct a class of local bounds for the 
EP, which improves the generic bounds in a given region. The 
behavior of error probability (EP) as a function of 
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and other system parameters is 
fundamental for assessing the design of digital wireless 
communication systems.  An analytical framework based on 
the log-concavity property of the EP is proposed. To prove 
this property for a class of signals with constellations on a 
multidimensional regular grid in the presence of Gaussian   
distributed disturbances such as thermal noise and 
interference. The behavior of the EP is important for local 
bounds. the EP is reported on log-scale and investigated as a 
function of the signal-to-total disturbance ratio in decibel 
(dB). The advantage is, it uses tighter bounds in the region of 
interest. But it increase in complexity with the usage of 
log-concavity property.  
The aim of [4] is to provide  routing support for 
ad-hoc, wireless networks under conditions of sporadic 
connectivity and ever-present network partitions. Then the 
proposed algorithms that exploit the relative position of 
stationary devices and non-randomness in the movement of 
mobile agents in the network. In order to pass packets 
between these stationary isolated agents, packets can be 
transmitted to passing mobile agents: wearable computers, 
palmtops, or laptops carried by a human, robot, mail cart, or 
elevator. From there, the packet might make several hops 
between mobile and stationary agents as it makes its way to its 
destination. The main tradeoff is the additional storage at 
nodes as packets are stored, carried, and forwarded to the 
destination. Epidemic routing is designed to maximize 
exposure by distributing packets as widely as possible, while 
requiring buffers of infinite length. We proposed  a variety of 
drop strategies such as , 
 Drop-Random (DRA): the packet to be dropped is 
chosen at random. 
 Drop-Least-Encountered (DLE): the packet is 
dropped based on the estimated    likelihood of delivery. 
The schemes mentioned in [5] are used to route 
packets efficiently through a highly partitioned network.when 
agents are restricted to local communication, the problem will 
occured. The main objectives are the development of 
cooperative driver assistance systems on the one hand and the 
development of a selforganising ad-hoc radio network as a 
communication. To achieve a suitable communication 
system, algorithms for radio ad-hoc networks with extremely 
high dynamic network topologies are developed and 
prototypes tested in the vehicles. CarTALK 2000 tries to 
build application clusters in three ways such as, information 
and warning functions, communication-based longitudinal 
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control systems and  co-operative assistance systems. The 
benefits consist of savings of time costs, vehicle operating 
costs, accident costs and environmental costs (pollution, 
CO2). To determine a benefit-cost-ratio the benefits have to 
be related with the system costs. The effects for the individual 
user can be investigated by break-even-analyses that confront 
the benefits for the individual user with his costs .  
There are two types of existing incentive mechanisms for 
stimulating cooperation in wireless networks:  
1) Reputation-based approaches  
2) Credit-based approaches 
Reputation-based approaches rely on observing the 
behavior of neighbor nodes and punishing the detected 
uncooperative nodes to stimulate cooperation. In VANETs, 
however, for a distributed reputation system, the deviating 
behaviors of a selfish node are more difficult to be observed 
and determined by other nodes because the connections with  
the same nodes are occasional. 
 Credit-based mechanisms, to encourage cooperation by 
rewarding credits to the cooperative nodes. This idea is 
particularly appropriate for many applications in VANETs, 
such as disseminating advertising using vehicles. In existing 
works for traditional multihop networks, the credit based 
mechanisms depend on end-to-end connections to determine 
how many credits each node should receive. In VANETs 
since end-to-end paths are not guaranteed at all, existing 
credit based mechanisms cannot be used either. 
III. PROPOSED SYSTEM 
The overall architecture of the system consists of a number 
of smart vehicles that have VANET communication devices 
installed and a central authority called the virtual credit center 
(VCC). As in many other incentive schemes for wireless 
networks and, particularly, the VANET , the VCC is used. 
The VCC issues a certificate to each node, and each node has 
an account (of virtual currency) in the VCC. Nodes do not 
need to connect to the VCC all the time. Instead, nodes save 
and store the information that they need to communicate with 
the VCC temporarily, and when they are close to some 
infrastructures, they connect to the VCC and communicate 
with it (including receiving credits). 
The complete incentive scheme consists of the 
programs installed at each node in the VANETs and the 
algorithm running at the VCC. The programs at each node can 
further be divided into three groups of functions:  
1) The source node 
2) The intermediate node 
3) The destination node 
 
Fig.1. Incentive scheme implementation architecture 
 
 
 
A. Hardware Requirements: 
  Processor   : Intel Pentium IV 
 Processor Speed  : 1.4 GHz 
 Memory (RAM)  : 512MB 
 Hard disk   : 40GB 
 Monitor   : 14 “IBM color monitor 
 Input Device  : Keyboard (104) 
B.  Software Requirements: 
 Operating System : LINUX 
 Simulator Tool  : NS2 
 Language   : C++ and TCL 
 Platform   : Independent 
 
C. SYSTEM MODULES 
• Creation of Nodes 
• Creation of Agents 
• Coalitional game Model 
• Allocation of Payoff 
 
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
             Node configuration essentially consists of defining 
the different node characteristics before creating them. This 
may consist of the type of addressing structure used in the 
simulation,defining the network components for mobile 
nodes,turning on or off the trace options at Agent/R 
outer/MAC levels,selecting the type of adhoc routing 
protocol for wireless nodes or defining their energy model. 
              Adding a New Agent in NS2 uses C++ to be coded. 
Unlike conventional C++,NS2 uses TclCL and OTCL. There 
are 6 TclCL classes that are needed to develop any module in 
NS2. 
• Tcl 
• TclClass 
• EmbeddedTcl 
• TclObject 
• TclCommand 
  In a coalitional game, there are a number of players. 
These players correspond to the nodes in a VANET. When 
the players in a subset decide to cooperate within the subset, 
the subset is called a coalition. In particular, the coalition of 
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all players is called the grand coalition. Hence, whenever a 
message needs to be forwarded in a VANET, all involved 
nodes have incentives to form a grand coalition. 
In coalitional game theory, the central concept is the 
formation of coalitions. Each coalition is a subset of game 
players who cooperatively join forces. Each selfish player 
always tries to join the coalition that can maximize its own 
payoff share. All players join the grand coalition so that any 
two players cooperate with each other. Since each player has 
the freedom to choose the coalition to join based on its own 
interests, it may ensure that joining the grand coalition is in 
the best interest of every player. 
To achieve the grand coalition, the core in the game and  
payoff allocation to each player in the coalition that satisfies 
the core requirement. 
 
For each intermediate node, its share of payoff should 
reflect its contribution in the game. Hence, the 
payoff-allocation function for intermediate nodes is designed 
as based on two types of behaviors in the coalition, i.e., 
receiving and forwarding. 
 
 
where,  is the number of times that the intermediate 
node I receives one copy of the message from some other 
node.   is the number of times that i successfully 
forwards one copy of the message to another node following 
the  routing protocol .  α and β are the rewards for the 
receiving and forwarding behaviors, respectively. 
 is the amount of reward to node i for reporting 
the meeting records. Note that dest. Can be viewed as an 
intermediate node, which only receives copies without further 
forwarding. 
• Payoff Allocation to the Source Node 
The payoff allocation to the source node contains two parts: 
the gains by successfully delivering message copies to dest. 
subtracted by rewards used to pay the intermediate nodes. The 
payoff allocation function for src. is defined as 
 
 
 
 
Fig.2. Moving nodes  due to mobility 
 
Since its a dynamic topology Fig.2. shows about the nodes 
moving due to mobility.  
 
 
Fig.3. Message forwarding between nodes 
 
            Fig.3. shows the message forwarding between the 
needed mobile nodes. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
In vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs), because of the 
nonexistence of end-to-end connections, it is essential that 
nodes take advantage of connection opportunities to forward 
messages to make end-to-end messaging possible. Thus, it is 
crucial to make sure that nodes have incentives to forward 
messages for others, despite the fact that the routing protocols 
in VANETs are different from traditional end-to-end routing 
protocols. In this paper, stimulation of message forwarding in 
VANETs is concerned. This approach is based on coalitional 
game theory, particularly, an incentive scheme for VANETs 
is proposed and with this scheme, following the routing 
protocol is in the best interest of each node. In addition, a 
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lightweight approach is proposed for taking the limited 
storage space of each node into consideration. 
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